# Signaling Design for MIMO-NOMA With Different Security Requirements 

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#### Abstract

Signaling design for secure transmission in two-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) networks with different security requirements is investigated. A base station broadcasts multicast data to all users and unicast data and confidential data targeted to certain users. We categorize the above channel into three communication scenarios depending on the security requirements. The associated problem in each scenario is nonconvex. We propose a unified approach, called the power splitting scheme, for optimizing the rate equations corresponding to each scenario. The proposed method converts the optimization of the secure MIMO-NOMA channel into a set of simpler problems, namely multicast, point-to-point, and wiretap MIMO problems, corresponding to the three basic messages: multicast, private/unicast, and confidential messages. We then leverage existing solutions to design signaling (covariance matrix) for the above problems such that the messages are transmitted with high security and reliability. Numerical results illustrate the efficacy of the proposed covariance matrix (linear precoding and power allocation) design. In the case of no multicast messages, we also reformulate the nonconvex problem into weighted sum rate (WSR) maximization problems by applying the block successive maximization method and generalizing the zero duality gap. The two methods have their advantages and limitations. Power splitting is a general tool that can be applied to the MIMO-NOMA with any combination of the three messages (multicast, private, and confidential) whereas the WSR maximization shows greater potential for secure MIMONOMA communication without multicasting. In such cases, the WSR maximization provides a slightly better rate than the power splitting method.


Index Terms-MIMO-NOMA, broadcast channel, physical layer security, power splitting, weighted sum rate, wiretap, multicast, unicast.

## I. Introduction

THE unprecedented wave of emerging devices has dramatically increased the requirements and challenges of resource allocation and spectrum utilization. To fulfill the demands, non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) at the physical (PHY) layer is a promising technique [3], [4] that has attracted remarkable attention both in academia and industry.

[^0]While several code-domain uplink NOMA schemes are developed in the literature [4], [5], downlink NOMA is based on well-known information-theoretic techniques for the broadcast channel (BC) [6]. Then, in the single-input single-output (SISO) NOMA, superposition coding (SC) at the transmitter and successive interference cancellation (SIC) at the receiver give the optimal strategy. Hence, a large body of work has assumed NOMA to be equivalent to SC-SIC, and applied SC-SIC to multipleinput multiple-output (MIMO) channels [7]-[10]. However, it is known that SC-SIC is not capacity-achieving in the MIMO-BC and dirty-paper coding (DPC) is the optimal strategy [11]-[13]. Similarly, in MIMO-NOMA with PHY layer security, SC-SIC cannot achieve secure capacity, and secret DPC (S-DPC) is the optimal solution [14], [15]. In this paper, NOMA is defined broadly and refers to any technique that allows simultaneous transmission over the same resources [12], i.e., concurrent nonorthogonal transmission. That is, MIMO-NOMA is equivalent to the MIMO-BC.

## A. MIMO-NOMA With Secrecy

Today, there is a trend to merge multiple services in one transmission. This is referred to as PHY layer service integration [16]. Integrated services usually include three fundamental services: multicast, unicast, and confidential services, which can be realized by common, private/individual, and confidential messages, respectively. Especially, secure transmission of confidential messages requires PHY layer security which has been introduced as additional protection for secure transmission [17].

This work is concerned with different security requirements for two-user MIMO-NOMA networks, in which three different types of messages can be transmitted:

- Common message $M_{0}$ [18]: a common message is transmitted in such a way that all users can decode it. For example, the base station (BS) broadcasts daily news or amber alerts to all online users.
- Private message $M_{p}$ [6]: a private or unicast/individual message is a message intended for a specific user. For instance, the BS provides targeted advertisements and recommended videos that are available only to interested users. This message is not encoded securely, and as such, it can be decoded by other users.
- Confidential message $M_{c}$ [19]: a confidential message is similar to a private message but is to be kept secret from other users. For example, personal email accounts access and online banking transactions. Here, encoding is such that the message cannot be decoded by others.

TABLE I
A Summary of Communication Scenarios With Different Combinations of Common, Private, and Confidential Messages

|  | Communication scenarios | $M_{0}$ | $M_{1}$ | $M_{2}$ | Capacity region | Signaling schemes |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| OMA | Multicasting | Public | - | - | $[18]$ | Heuristic precoding [27], closed-form [1] |
|  | P2P MIMO | - | Private | - | [28] | SVD and WF [28] |
|  | Wiretap | - | Confidential | - | $[19]$ | GSVD [29], AOWF [30], RM [31] |
|  | Two private | - | Private | Private | [6], [32]-[34] | GSVD [35], this work |
|  | Private and confidential | - | Confidential | Private | [23] | This work |
| NOMA | Two confidential | - | Confidential | Confidential | $[14]$ | GSVD [36], BSMM [37], PS [38] |
|  | Common and one confidential | Public | Confidential | - | [39] | GSVD [40], RM [41] |
|  | Scenario A | Public | Private | Private | $[11],[20],[21]$ | This work |
|  | Scenario B | Public | Confidential | Private | $[22],[23]$ | This work |
|  | Scenario C | Public | Confidential | Confidential | $[15],[24]$ | This work |

Early information-theoretic works [11], [15], [20]-[23] have established the capacity regions of two-user MIMO-BC with different security requirements. These include the MIMO-BC with one common and two independent private messages [11], [20], [21], the MIMO-BC with private, confidential, and common messages [22], [23], and the MIMO-BC with one common and two confidential messages [15], [24]. However, their primary purpose is to derive capacity regions or to construct coding strategies that achieve certain rate regions. The solutions are based on DPC or S-DPC and usually are given as a union over all possible transmit covariance matrices satisfying certain power constraints. Implementation of DPC requires sophisticated random coding [25], and finding practical dirty paper codes close to the capacity is not easy [26]. Linear precoding is a popular alternative to simplify the transmission design [13], [26].

The two-user MIMO-NOMA can be classified into three communication scenarios with different security requirements as shown in Fig 1. The classification is mainly based on the well-established information-theoretic results:

- Scenario A (no security): two independent private messages $M_{1 p}$ and $M_{2 p}$ (one for each user) and a common message $M_{0}$ for both users are ordered [11], [20], [21]. In this case, we have a MIMO-NOMA with common and two private messages $\left(M_{0}, M_{1 p}, M_{2 p}\right)$;
- Scenario B (security for one user): a confidential message $M_{1 c}$ for user 1, a private message $M_{2 p}$ for user 2, and one common message $M_{0}$ for both users are ordered [23]. Then, a MIMO-NOMA with common, private, and confidential messages $\left(M_{0}, M_{1 c}, M_{2 p}\right)$ is formed;
- Scenario C (security for both users): two confidential messages $M_{1 c}$ and $M_{2 c}$ (one for each user), and a common message $M_{0}$ for both users are needed [15], [24]. In this case, a MIMO-NOMA with common and confidential messages $\left(M_{0}, M_{1 c}, M_{2 c}\right)$ is obtained.
The three scenarios overall cover nine problems, or communication scenarios (see Table I). The combinations of different types of messages are also named integrated services [16].


## B. Motivation and Related Problems

While the capacity regions of the three different messages are characterized, it is still unknown how to identify optimal or implementation-efficient solutions to achieve those regions. Thus, this paper is motivated by the following question: How
can we maximize the secrecy rate for the MIMO-NOMA with different security requirements in an acceptable computational complexity?

The state-of-the-art includes solutions only for some special combinations of the messages and the orthogonal multiple access (OMA) case in which only one message, out of the three messages mentioned earlier, is transmitted. These are summarized in Table I, and some are highlighted below.

- Two private messages [6], [32], [33]: When there is no common message in Scenario A, the problem reduces to the MIMO-BC and DPC gives the capacity region. Alternatively, the multiple access channel (MAC) to BC duality [32] can be applied to iteratively achieve the capacity [34]. Also, an analytic linear precoding scheme based on generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD) is designed for the special case where the two users are equipped with the same number of antennas [35].
- One confidential message [19]: When there is neither a common nor private message in Scenario B, the system reduces to the MIMO wiretap channel [19]. Various linear precoding schemes, including GSVD [29], alternating optimization and water filling (AOWF) [30], and rotation modeling (RM) [31] are known for this problem.
- Two confidential messages [14]: When $M_{0}$ is empty in Scenario C, the problem reduces to the MIMO-BC with two confidential messages. It is proven in [14, Theorem 1] that both users can reach their respective maximum secrecy rates simultaneously by S-DPC. Low-complexity approaches, such as GSVD [36], weighted sum rate (WSR) maximization with block successive maximization method (BSMM) [37], and power splitting (PS) method [38] are developed. We generalize the PS into a more general case.
- Common and confidential messages [39]: Different linear precoding schemes, including GSVD-based precoding [40] and RM with random search [41] are known in this case.
- Only one common message [18], [27]: If there is only a common message and no individual messages to be transmitted, the system becomes a multicast channel. A heuristic precoding with iterations is investigated in [27], and an analytical solution with a convex tool is given in [1].
However, these problems are all special cases of the three general scenarios mentioned earlier. Signaling designs for the general cases are still unknown in general.


Fig. 1. Communication scenarios with different combinations of security requirements based on the information-theoretic results. Consider three communication scenarios in which the BS sends different combinations of the three messages.

## C. Contributions and Organization

As illustrated, the problems listed in Table I are all related to the three scenarios shown in Fig. 1. Nonetheless, there are no solutions for the general cases. In this paper, we propose a new solution, named the power splitting method, which applies to all of those problems. This method decomposes the secure MIMO-NOMA channel into point-to-point (P2P), wiretap, and multicasting MIMO channels. Then, we design one algorithm that can be used in all problems in Table I to approach their corresponding capacity regions. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:

- We first split the total power among the three messages and then reformulate the secrecy capacity optimization problems into three sub-problems. Particularly, Scenario A (only private massages) is decomposed into two P2P MIMO channels; Scenario B (private and confidential messages) is decomposed into one P2P MIMO and one wiretap channel; and, Scenario C (only confidential messages) is decomposed into two wiretap channels.
- Linear precoder and power allocation matrices are designed for private and confidential messages by extending the analytical solution of the P2P MIMO problem and the numerical solution of the wiretap channel to the MIMONOMA with different secrecy scenarios. For multicasting, we use a combination of analytical solutions and a numerical solution based on a convex tool. Finally, we propose an algorithm for all different secrecy scenarios.
- When there is no common message, a WSR maximization is formulated in all scenarios. We prove that the WSR problem has zero duality gap in all scenarios, and the KKT conditions are necessary for the optimal solutions. Besides, we derive and generalize an iterative algorithm for all scenarios by applying the BSMM [37], [42]. Especially, in Scenario A, we provide an alternative solution that directly optimizes the WSR of the DPC region with BSMM instead of applying MAC-BC duality.
One main benefit of the proposed signaling design (power splitting, linear precoding, and power allocation) is its ability to be generalized to more complicated scenarios, e.g., when there are more than two users.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the channel model and formulate the problems for the three scenarios. We introduce a power splitting method to all scenarios in Section III-A, and a signaling design for each in Section III-B. For the subcases without common messages, we generalize a WSR based on BSMM for all scenarios in Section IV. We then present numerical results in Section V and conclude the paper in Section VI.

Notations: $\operatorname{tr}(\cdot)$ and $(\cdot)^{T}$ denote trace and transpose of matrices. $E\{\cdot\}$ denotes expectation. $\operatorname{diag}\left(\lambda_{1}, \ldots, \lambda_{n}\right)$ represents diagonal matrix with elements $\lambda_{1}, \ldots, \lambda_{n} . \mathbf{Q} \succcurlyeq \mathbf{0}$ represents that $\mathbf{Q}$ is a positive semidefinite matrix. $[x]^{+}$gives the max value of $x$ and $0 . \mathbf{I}$ is an identity matrix.

## II. System Model

Considering a two-user MIMO-NOMA network. A BS equipped with $n_{t}$ antennas simultaneously serves two users, in which user 1 and user 2 are equipped with $n_{1}$ and $n_{2}$ antennas, respectively. The transmitted signal to user 1 and user 2 share the same time slot and frequency.

The received signals at user 1 and user 2 are given by

$$
\begin{align*}
& \mathbf{y}_{1}=\mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{x}+\mathbf{w}_{1},  \tag{1a}\\
& \mathbf{y}_{2}=\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{x}+\mathbf{w}_{2}, \tag{1b}
\end{align*}
$$

in which $\mathbf{H}_{1} \in \mathbb{R}^{n_{1} \times n_{t}}$ and $\mathbf{H}_{2} \in \mathbb{R}^{n_{2} \times n_{t}}$ are the channel matrices for user 1 and user 2, respectively. The elements of the channels are drawn from independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian distributions. $\mathbf{w}_{1} \in \mathbb{R}^{n_{1} \times 1}$ and $\mathbf{w}_{2} \in \mathbb{R}^{n_{2} \times 1}$ are i.i.d. Gaussian noise vectors whose elements are zero mean and unit variance. The input $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^{n_{t} \times 1}$ is a vector consisting of three components

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathbf{x}=\mathbf{x}_{0}+\mathbf{x}_{1}+\mathbf{x}_{2} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\mathbf{x}_{k} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{Q}_{k}\right), k=0,1,2$, is the input corresponding to two kinds of services: the multicast message $M_{0}$ and secure messages (private $M_{p}$ and/or confidential $M_{c}$ ) of user 1 and user 2, in which $\mathbf{Q}_{k} \succcurlyeq \mathbf{0}$, is the covariance matrix corresponding to $\mathbf{x}_{k}$. The channel input is subject to an average total power constraint

$$
\begin{equation*}
\operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbb{E}\left\{\mathbf{x} \mathbf{x}^{T}\right\}\right)=\operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{0}+\mathbf{Q}_{1}+\mathbf{Q}_{2}\right) \leq P \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

We denote $R_{0}, R_{j p}$, and $R_{j c}, j=1,2$, as the achievable rates associated with the multicast, private, and confidential messages transmitted by the corresponding user $j$, respectively.

In the following, we provide the achievable rate region for each scenario.

## A. Scenario A (One Common and Two Private Messages)

The DPC rate region of the MIMO-NOMA with common and two private messages is realized by [11], [20],

$$
\begin{equation*}
R_{A}(P)=\operatorname{conv}\left\{\mathcal{R}_{12}^{\mathrm{DPC}} \cup \mathcal{R}_{21}^{\mathrm{DPC}}\right\} \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

in which conv is the convex hull operator. $\mathcal{R}_{12}^{\mathrm{DPC}}$ consists of all triples ( $R_{1 p}, R_{2 p}, R_{0}$ ) satisfying

$$
\begin{equation*}
R_{0} \leq \min \left(R_{01}, R_{02}\right) \tag{5a}
\end{equation*}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
R_{1 p} & \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{1}^{T}\right|  \tag{5b}\\
R_{2 p} & \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\left(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right)^{-1} \mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right| \tag{5c}
\end{align*}
$$

where

$$
\begin{equation*}
R_{0 j} \triangleq \frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\frac{\mathbf{H}_{j} \mathbf{Q}_{0} \mathbf{H}_{j}^{T}}{\left(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{j}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}+\mathbf{Q}_{2}\right) \mathbf{H}_{j}^{T}\right)}\right|, j=1,2 \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

with the total power constraint (3). $\mathcal{R}_{21}^{\mathrm{DPC}}$ is obtained from $\mathcal{R}_{12}^{\mathrm{DPC}}$ by swapping the subscripts 1 and 2 corresponding to different DPC encoding orders. When each user has a single antenna, the problem can be transferred to a linear semi-definite convex optimization [11, Section III], but the MIMO case is in general still unknown. Without the common message, the capacity of the MIMO BC is given in [32], [33].

## B. Scenario B (Common, Private, and Confidential Messages)

In this scenario, only user 1 requires a confidential message. The secrecy capacity region $R_{B}(P)$ under a total power constraint (3) is given by a set of rate triples $\left(R_{1 c}, R_{2 p}, R_{0}\right)$ satisfying [23, Theorem 2]

$$
\begin{align*}
& R_{0} \leq \min \left(R_{01}, R_{02}\right)  \tag{7a}\\
& R_{1 c} \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{1}^{T}\right|-\frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right|,  \tag{7b}\\
& R_{2 p} \leq \frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\left(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right)^{-1} \mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right| \tag{7c}
\end{align*}
$$

The entire secrecy capacity region is achieved using DPC to cancel out the signal of private $M_{2 p}$ at user 2, the other variant, i.e., DPC against $M_{1 c}$ at user 1, is unnecessary. This is different from Scenario A for which the capacity region is exhausted by taking the convex hull of both variants ( $\mathcal{R}_{21}^{\mathrm{DPC}}$ and $\mathcal{R}_{12}^{\mathrm{DPC}}$ ).

## C. Scenario C (One Common and Two Confidential Messages)

The secrecy capacity region $R_{C}(P)$ of the MIMO-BC with one common and two confidential messages under the average total power constraint (3) can be expressed as [15, Theorem 2]

$$
\begin{align*}
R_{0} \leq & \min \left(R_{01}, R_{02}\right)  \tag{8a}\\
R_{1 c} \leq & \frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{1}^{T}\right|-\frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right|,  \tag{8b}\\
R_{2 c} \leq & \frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\left(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right)^{-1} \mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right| \\
& -\frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\left(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{1}^{T}\right)^{-1} \mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \mathbf{H}_{1}^{T}\right|, \tag{8c}
\end{align*}
$$

The secrecy capacity region is characterized by S-DPC [15], [24]. ${ }^{1}$ In this scenario, both users' transmissions are secret from each other. User 1 with confidential messages $M_{1 c}$ treats user 2 as an eavesdropper, and vice versa.

[^1]

Fig. 2. System structure of power splitting method for different security scenarios.

The border of the secrecy capacity regions in (5), (7), (8) can be obtained by an exhaustive search over the set of all possible input covariance matrices. However, the complexity of such methods is prohibitive for practical implementations, which motivates us to develop a simpler signaling scheme. The covariance matrices achieving the capacity regions are not known in general due to the non-convexity.

## III. Power Splitting Method for MIMO-NOMA in All Scenarios

To introduce a new simpler and faster solution, we split the total power for three messages in each scenario. Then, we decouple the MIMO-NOMA channel of all secrecy scenarios into three different problems and solve them separately.

## A. Decomposing Secure MIMO-NOMA Into Simpler Channels

We decompose the MIMO-NOMA into different problems in this section. The structure of our decomposition of the MIMONOMA into different problems is shown in Fig. 2. Due to some overlapping, such as the privacy part in Scenario A and Scenario B, the confidentiality part in Scenario B and Scenario C, we start with Step 1 to split the power between user 1 and user 2 for different usages. Then, Step $2 a$ and Step $2 b$ are for user 1 with private messages in Scenario A and confidentiality in Scenario B, respectively. Step $3 a$ and Step $3 b$ are for user 2 with private messages in Scenario A, and confidentiality in Scenario C, correspondingly. Lastly, Step 4 is for common message in all scenarios.

Step 1: Introducing power splitting factors $\alpha_{k} \in[0,1]$, $\sum_{k} \alpha_{k}=1, k=0,1,2$, we dedicate a fraction $\alpha_{1}$ of the total power to user 1, a fraction $\alpha_{2} \in\left[0, \alpha_{1}\right]$ to user 2 , and allocate the remaining power to the common message $M_{0}$ for both users $\left(P_{0}=\alpha_{0} P=\left(1-\alpha_{1}-\alpha_{2}\right) P\right)$. The optimal solution uses total power throughout the paper.

Step $2 a$ : We design the secure precoding for user 1 with private message $M_{1 p}$ in (5b) for Scenario A. Since the rate $R_{1 p}\left(\alpha_{1}\right)$ of user 1 is only controlled by the covariance matrix $\mathbf{Q}_{1}$ under the power constraint $P_{1}$, the interference-free link can be seen as a P2P MIMO with power $P_{1}$, which is

$$
\begin{gather*}
R_{1 p}\left(\alpha_{1}\right)=\max _{\mathbf{Q}_{1} \succeq \mathbf{0}} \frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{1}^{T}\right|  \tag{9a}\\
\text { s.t. } \operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}\right) \leq P_{1}=\alpha_{1} P \tag{9b}
\end{gather*}
$$

The solution $\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}$ is obtained analytically through singular value decomposition (SVD) and water filling (WF) [28].

Step 2b: In Scenario B and Scenario C, we design secure precoding for user 1 with confidential messages $M_{1 c}$ while treating the second user as an eavesdropper. Because covariance matrix $\mathrm{Q}_{1}$ is the only variable in $(7 \mathrm{~b})$ and $(8 \mathrm{~b})$, the problem can be seen as a wiretap channel under a transmit power $P_{1}$, which is

$$
\begin{gather*}
R_{1 c}\left(\alpha_{1}\right)=\max _{\mathbf{Q}_{1} \succeq \mathbf{0}} \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{1}^{T}\right|}{\left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right|},  \tag{10a}\\
\text { s.t. } \operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}\right) \leq P_{1}=\alpha P . \tag{10b}
\end{gather*}
$$

This problem is now the well-known MIMO wiretap channel [31], and standard MIMO wiretap solutions can be applied to obtain $\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}$.

Step 3a: To maximize the secrecy rate $R_{2 p}\left(\alpha_{2}\right)$ for user 2, we apply $\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}$ obtained in Step $2 a$ or Step $2 b$ to (5c) and (7c) in Scenario A and Scenario B, respectively. Thus, (5c) or (7c) can be represented as

$$
\begin{equation*}
R_{2 p}\left(\alpha_{2}\right)=\max _{\mathbf{Q}_{2} \succeq \mathbf{0}} \frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\left(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right)^{-1} \mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right| \tag{11a}
\end{equation*}
$$

$$
\begin{equation*}
\text { s.t. } \operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{2}\right) \leq P_{2}=\alpha_{2} P . \tag{11b}
\end{equation*}
$$

Since $\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}$ is already given, in the following we show that the above problem can be seen as a P2P MIMO problem under power $P_{2}$.

Theorem 1: The optimization problem in (11) with interference from user 1 can be converted to the optimization of a standard P2P MIMO channel

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{\mathbf{H}}_{2} \triangleq \mathbf{B}^{-\frac{1}{2}} \mathbf{C}^{T} \mathbf{H}_{2} \tag{12}
\end{equation*}
$$

in which $\mathbf{B}$ and $\mathbf{C}$ are the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of $\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}$.

Proof: Define

$$
\begin{equation*}
\boldsymbol{\Sigma} \triangleq \mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}=\mathbf{C B C}^{T} \tag{13}
\end{equation*}
$$

Then, the secrecy rate for user 2 can be written as

$$
\begin{align*}
R_{2 p}\left(\alpha_{2}\right) & =\max _{\mathbf{Q}_{2} \succeq \mathbf{0}} \frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1} \mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right| \\
& =\max _{\mathbf{Q}_{2} \succeq \mathbf{0}} \frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{C B}^{-1} \mathbf{C}^{T} \mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right| \\
& \stackrel{(a)}{=} \max _{\mathbf{Q}_{2} \succeq \mathbf{0}} \frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{B}^{-\frac{1}{2}} \mathbf{C}^{T} \mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T} \mathbf{C B}^{-\frac{1}{2}}\right| \\
& =\max _{\mathbf{Q}_{2} \succeq \mathbf{0}} \frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\dot{\mathbf{H}}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \dot{\mathbf{H}}_{2}^{T}\right| \tag{14}
\end{align*}
$$

in which (a) holds because of Sylvester's determinant theorem, i.e., $\operatorname{det}(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{X Y})=\operatorname{det}(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{Y X})$ where $\mathbf{X}=\mathbf{C B}^{-\frac{1}{2}}$ and $\mathbf{Y}=\mathbf{B}^{-\frac{1}{2}} \mathbf{C}^{T} \mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T} . \mathbf{C}$ is orthogonal, i.e., $\mathbf{C}^{-1}=\mathbf{C}^{T}$, and $\mathbf{B}$ is a diagonal matrix.

In view of (14), the problem in (11) becomes the standard P2P MIMO without interference over a modified channel. The solution $\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{*}$ can be obtained the same as Step $2 a$.

Step $3 b$ : To maximize the secrecy rate $R_{2 c}\left(\alpha_{2}\right)$ for user 2, we apply $\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}$ obtained in Step $2 b$ to (8c) for Scenario C. Thus, (8c) can be represented as

$$
R_{2 c}\left(\alpha_{2}\right)=\max _{\mathbf{Q}_{2} \succeq \mathbf{0}}\left\{\frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\frac{\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}}{\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}}\right|\right.
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& \left.\quad-\frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\frac{\mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \mathbf{H}_{1}^{T}}{\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*} \mathbf{H}_{1}^{T}}\right|\right\},  \tag{15a}\\
& \text { s.t. } \operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{2}\right) \leq P_{2}=(1-\alpha) P . \tag{15b}
\end{align*}
$$

Since $\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}$ is given after solving (10), next we show that the problem (15) can be seen as a wiretap channel where users 2 and 1 are the legitimate user and eavesdropper, respectively.

Theorem 2: [38] The above channel can be converted to a standard MIMO wiretap channel with

$$
\begin{align*}
\ddot{\mathbf{H}}_{1} \triangleq \mathbf{D}_{a}^{-\frac{1}{2}} \mathbf{E}_{a}^{T} \mathbf{H}_{1}  \tag{16a}\\
\ddot{\mathbf{H}}_{2} \triangleq \mathbf{D}_{b}^{-\frac{1}{2}} \mathbf{E}_{b}^{T} \mathbf{H}_{2} \tag{16b}
\end{align*}
$$

in which $\mathbf{D}_{a}$ and $\mathbf{E}_{a}$ are the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of $\mathbf{I}+$ $\mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*} \mathbf{H}_{1}^{T}$, and $\mathbf{D}_{b}$ and $\mathbf{E}_{b}$ are the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of $\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}$.

Then, the rate for user 2 can be written as

$$
\begin{equation*}
R_{2 c}\left(\alpha_{2}\right)=\max _{\mathbf{Q}_{2} \succeq \mathbf{0}} \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\left|\mathbf{I}+\ddot{\mathbf{H}}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \ddot{\mathbf{H}}_{2}^{T}\right|}{\left|\mathbf{I}+\ddot{\mathbf{H}}_{1} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \ddot{\mathbf{H}}_{1}^{T}\right|}, \tag{17}
\end{equation*}
$$

From (17), it is seen that similar to (10a), (15a) is the rate for a MIMO wiretap channel with channels $\ddot{\mathbf{H}}_{2}$ for the legitimate user and $\ddot{\mathbf{H}}_{1}$ for the eavesdropper. This problem now transfers to a MIMO wiretap channel, and we can obtain $\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{*}$ using any standard MIMO wiretap solutions.

Step 4: After distributing the power to both users for secrecy messages, we allocate the remaining power $P_{0}=\alpha_{0} P, \alpha_{0}=$ $1-\alpha_{1}-\alpha_{2}$ to the common message $M_{0}$ for both users. The (5a), (7a), and (8a) becomes

$$
\begin{gather*}
R_{0}\left(\alpha_{0}\right)=\max _{\mathbf{Q}_{0} \succeq \mathbf{0}} \min \left\{R_{0 j}\right\}, j=1,2  \tag{18a}\\
\text { s.t. } \operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{0}\right) \leq P_{0}=\alpha_{0} P \tag{18b}
\end{gather*}
$$

Since $\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}$ and $\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{*}$ are given, we can show that the above problem becomes MIMO multicasting [18] by applying the same approach as Theorem 1 again into (6). Specifically, let us define the denominator of (6) as

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathbf{K}_{j} \triangleq \mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{j}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}+\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{*}\right) \mathbf{H}_{j}^{T} \triangleq \mathbf{F}_{j} \mathbf{G}_{j} \mathbf{F}_{j}^{T}, \tag{19}
\end{equation*}
$$

for $j=1,2$, where the second equality is given by eigenvalue decomposition. Then, $R_{0 j}$ can be rewritten as

$$
\begin{align*}
R_{0 j} & =\frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{K}_{j}^{-1} \mathbf{H}_{j} \mathbf{Q}_{0} \mathbf{H}_{j}^{T}\right| \\
& =\frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{G}_{j}^{-\frac{1}{2}} \mathbf{F}_{j}^{T} \mathbf{H}_{j} \mathbf{Q}_{0} \mathbf{H}_{j}^{T} \mathbf{F}_{j} \mathbf{G}_{j}^{-\frac{1}{2}}\right|, \\
& =\frac{1}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\dddot{\mathbf{H}}_{j} \mathbf{Q}_{0} \ddot{\mathbf{H}}_{j}^{T}\right| \tag{20}
\end{align*}
$$

See the proof in Theorem 1. Then we have $\dddot{\mathbf{H}}_{j}=\mathbf{G}_{j}^{-\frac{1}{2}} \mathbf{F}_{j}^{T} \mathbf{H}_{j}$, $j=1,2$.

The problem (18) with (20) is now identified as the MIMO multicasting which is to maximize the minimum user rate configuration, and the optimal solution $\mathbf{Q}_{0}^{*}$ can be achieved by semi-definite programming (SDP), i.e., CVX, however, it may incur a high computational complexity for multiple users and antennas. As we will see in the next subsection, analytical solutions together with a convex tool for different cases are proposed for multicast transmission.

## B. The Signaling Design

We solve each sub-problem in this subsection, i.e., design precoding and power allocation for all the secrecy scenarios. Scenario A is composed of two P2P MIMO and one multicasting; Scenario B consists of one wiretap channel, one P2P MIMO, and one multicasting; Scenario C has two wiretap channels and one multicasting.

Scenario A: (Step $1 \rightarrow$ Step $2 a \rightarrow$ Step $3 a \rightarrow$ Step 4)
Problem (9) is a P2P MIMO which is convex and has a closedform solution given in the following Lemma [28].

Lemma 1: [28] For P2P MIMO problem $\max _{\mathbf{Q} \succcurlyeq 0} \log \mid \mathbf{I}+$ $\mathbf{H Q H}^{T}$ | under a total power constraint, the optimal solution is given by $\mathbf{Q}^{*}=\boldsymbol{\Psi} \boldsymbol{\Gamma} \boldsymbol{\Psi}^{T}$. in which $\mathbf{H}=$ $\boldsymbol{\Phi} \operatorname{diag}\left(\tau_{1}, \tau_{2}, \ldots, \tau_{n}\right) \boldsymbol{\Psi}^{T}, \quad \tau_{i} \geq 0, \quad \forall i, \quad \boldsymbol{\Gamma}=\operatorname{diag}[(\mu-$ $\left.\left.1 / \tau_{1}^{2}\right)^{+}, \ldots,\left(\mu-1 / \tau_{n}^{2}\right)^{+}\right], \mu$ is the water level.

The solutions of (9) in Step $2 a$ and (11) in Step $3 a$ are achieved by replacing $\mathbf{H}$ in Lemma 1 by $\mathbf{H}_{1}$ and $\dot{\mathbf{H}}_{2}$, respectively, using Theorem 1.

To precode for the common message $M_{0}$ in Step 4. Define the optimal precoding matrices $\mathbf{Q}_{01}^{*}$ and $\mathbf{Q}_{02}^{*}$ for $R_{01}$ and $R_{02}$ in (20), respectively, then we have [1]

- Case 1: $R_{01}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{01}^{*}\right) \leq R_{02}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{01}^{*}\right)$, then the optimal multicast covariance matrix of (18) is $\mathbf{Q}_{0}^{*}:=\mathbf{Q}_{01}^{*}$.
- Case 2: $R_{01}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{02}^{*}\right) \geq R_{02}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{02}^{*}\right)$, the optimal multicast covariance matrix of (18) is $\mathbf{Q}_{0}^{*}:=\mathbf{Q}_{02}^{*}$.
- Case 3: Otherwise, the optimal multicast covariance matrix of (18) can be obtained by a random search.
For Case 1 or Case 2, Lemma 1 [28] is applied. For Case 3, optimal $\mathbf{Q}_{0}^{*}$ happens when the two convex functions are equal. Then, we can generate $\mathbf{Q}_{0}$ using the rotation method and search the parameters non-linearly [41].

Finally, DPC rate region $\mathcal{R}_{21}^{\mathrm{DPC}}$ can be reached by exhaustively searching over all power fractions $\alpha_{1}, \alpha_{2}$ and $\alpha_{0}$. For each pair of power splitting parameters $\alpha_{1}, \alpha_{2}$, and $\alpha_{0}$, we solve precoding matrices $\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}^{*}$, and $\mathbf{Q}_{0}^{*}$ (and thus $R_{1 p}\left(\alpha_{1}\right)$, $R_{2 p}\left(\alpha_{2}\right)$, and $R_{0}\left(\alpha_{0}\right)$ ). Alternatively, $\mathcal{R}_{21}^{\mathrm{DPC}}$ is obtained by encoding the private messages for user 2 and user 1 , then the common message for both. We can solve $\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{*}$ followed by $\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}$ and $\mathbf{Q}_{0}^{*}$ to obtain $\bar{R}_{1 p}\left(\alpha_{1}\right), \bar{R}_{2 p}\left(\alpha_{2}\right)$, and $\bar{R}_{0}\left(\alpha_{0}\right)$, respectively.

Corollary 1: The achievable DPC rate region for secure MIMO-NOMA Scenario A under the total power is the convex hull of all rate triples

$$
\begin{equation*}
R_{A}(P)=\operatorname{conv}\left\{\left(\bigcup_{\alpha_{k}} \mathcal{R}_{12}^{\mathrm{DPC}}\left(\alpha_{k}\right)\right) \bigcup\left(\bigcup_{\alpha_{k}} \mathcal{R}_{21}^{\mathrm{DPC}}\left(\alpha_{k}\right)\right)\right\} \tag{21}
\end{equation*}
$$

$\mathcal{R}_{12}^{\mathrm{DPC}}\left(\alpha_{k}\right)=\left(R_{1 p}^{*}\left(\alpha_{1}\right), R_{2 p}^{*}\left(\alpha_{2}\right), R_{0}^{*}\left(\alpha_{0}\right)\right), k=0,1,2$, and is obtained by encoding the private messages for first user 1 then user 2 followed by the common message for both, whereas $\mathcal{R}_{21}^{\mathrm{DPC}}\left(\alpha_{k}\right)=\left(\bar{R}_{1 p}^{*}\left(\alpha_{1}\right), \bar{R}_{2 p}^{*}\left(\alpha_{2}\right), \bar{R}_{0}^{*}\left(\alpha_{0}\right)\right)$ is obtained in the reverse order of private messages (first user 2 then user 1).

Scenario B: (Step $1 \rightarrow$ Step $2 b \rightarrow$ Step $3 a \rightarrow$ Step 4)
Standard MIMO wiretap solutions can be applied to design covariance matrix $\mathbf{Q}_{1}$ for Step $2 b$. One fast approach is rotationbased linear precoding [31]. In this method, the covariance matrix $\mathbf{Q}_{1}$ is eigendecomposed into one rotation matrix $\mathbf{V}_{1}$ and
one power allocation matrix $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}_{1}$ [31], [41] as

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathbf{Q}_{1}=\mathbf{V}_{1} \boldsymbol{\Lambda}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1}^{T} \tag{22}
\end{equation*}
$$

Consequently, the secrecy capacity of user 1 is

$$
\begin{align*}
R_{1 c}\left(\alpha_{1}\right) & =\max _{\mathbf{Q}_{1} \succeq 0} \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1} \boldsymbol{\Lambda}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1}^{T} \mathbf{H}_{1}^{T}\right|}{\left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{V}_{1} \mathbf{\Lambda}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{1}^{T} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right|}  \tag{23a}\\
\text { s.t. } \quad & \sum_{n=1}^{n_{t}} \lambda_{1 n} \leq P_{1}=\alpha P \tag{23b}
\end{align*}
$$

in which $\lambda_{1 n}, n=\left\{1, \ldots, n_{t}\right\}$, is a diagonal element of ma$\operatorname{trix} \boldsymbol{\Lambda}_{1}=\operatorname{diag}\left(\lambda_{11}, \ldots, \lambda_{1 n_{t}}\right)$. The rotation matrix $\mathbf{V}_{1}$ can be obtained by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathbf{V}_{1}=\prod_{p=1}^{n_{t}-1} \prod_{q=p+1}^{n_{t}} \mathbf{V}_{p q} \tag{24}
\end{equation*}
$$

in which the basic rotation matrix $\mathbf{V}_{p q}$ is a Givens matrix which is an identity matrix except that its elements in the $p$ th row and $q$ th column, i.e., $v_{p p}, v_{p q}, v_{q p}$, and $v_{q q}$ are replaced by

$$
\left[\begin{array}{cc}
v_{p p} & v_{p q}  \tag{25}\\
v_{q p} & v_{q q}
\end{array}\right]=\left[\begin{array}{cc}
\cos \theta_{1 p q} & -\sin \theta_{1 p q} \\
\sin \theta_{1 p q} & \cos \theta_{1 p q}
\end{array}\right],
$$

in which $\theta_{1 p q}$ is rotation angle corresponding to the rotation matrix $\mathbf{V}_{p q}$. Then, we will optimize the parameterized problem by applying numerical approaches such as Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) method [43] to obtain the solution $\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}$ (thus $R_{1 c}^{*}\left(\alpha_{1}\right)$ ). To obtain $\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{*}$ and $R_{2 p}^{*}\left(\alpha_{2}\right)$ in Step $3 a$, $\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}$ above is applied in Theorem 1, and we solve the modified P2P MIMO problem using Lemma 1. The precoding approach for Step 4 is the same as Scenario A. The achievable secrecy rate for Scenario B is given by the following corollary.

Corollary 2: The achievable rate region for secure MIMONOMA Scenario B under the total power is the convex hull of all rate triples

$$
\begin{equation*}
R_{B}(P)=\bigcup_{\alpha_{k}}\left(R_{1 c}^{*}\left(\alpha_{1}\right), R_{2 p}^{*}\left(\alpha_{2}\right), R_{0}^{*}\left(\alpha_{0}\right)\right) \tag{26}
\end{equation*}
$$

## Scenario C: (Step $1 \rightarrow$ Step $2 b \rightarrow$ Step $3 b \rightarrow$ Step 4)

In Scenario C, the steps are the same as Scenario B except for Step $3 b$ which can be seen as a wiretap channel instead of P2P MIMO. Then, we apply Theorem 2 and solve (17) instead. Similar to the precoding in Step $2 b$ of Scenario B, the covariance matrix $\mathbf{Q}_{2}$ can be written by rotation method as $\mathbf{Q}_{2}=\mathbf{V}_{2} \mathbf{\Lambda}_{2} \mathbf{V}_{2}^{T}$, where the rotation matrix $\mathbf{V}_{2}$ is defined similarly to $\mathbf{V}_{1}$ in (24) with rotation angles are $\theta_{2 p q}$. Therefore, the optimization problem for $R_{2 c}\left(\alpha_{2}\right)$ becomes

$$
\begin{align*}
R_{2 c}\left(\alpha_{2}\right) & =\max _{\mathbf{Q}_{2} \succeq \mathbf{0}} \frac{1}{2} \log \frac{\left|\mathbf{I}+\ddot{\mathbf{H}}_{2} \mathbf{V}_{2} \boldsymbol{\Lambda}_{2} \mathbf{V}_{2}^{T} \ddot{\mathbf{H}}_{2}^{T}\right|}{\left|\mathbf{I}+\ddot{\mathbf{H}}_{1} \mathbf{V}_{2} \boldsymbol{\Lambda}_{2} \mathbf{V}_{2}^{T} \ddot{\mathbf{H}}_{1}^{T}\right|}  \tag{27a}\\
\text { s.t. } & \sum_{n=1}^{n_{t}} \lambda_{2 n} \leq P_{2}=(1-\alpha) P \tag{27b}
\end{align*}
$$

in which $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}_{2}=\operatorname{diag}\left(\lambda_{21}, \ldots, \lambda_{2 n_{t}}\right)$. This problem is again similar to (23).

In the power splitting scheme, we solve $\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}^{*}$, and $\mathbf{Q}_{0}^{*}$ to obtain $R_{1 c}^{*}\left(\alpha_{1}\right), R_{2 c}^{*}\left(\alpha_{2}\right)$, and $R_{0}^{*}\left(\alpha_{0}\right)$ with respect to power splitting parameters pair $\left(\alpha_{1}, \alpha_{2}, \alpha_{0}\right)$. Alternatively, we can first solve for $\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{*}$ followed by $\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}$ last $\mathbf{Q}_{0}^{*}$ (i.e., first $\bar{R}_{1 c}^{*}\left(\alpha_{1}\right), \bar{R}_{2 c}^{*}\left(\alpha_{2}\right)$, then $\left.\bar{R}_{0}^{*}\left(\alpha_{0}\right)\right)$. In general, changing the order

```
Algorithm 1: Power Splitting for all Three Scenarios.
    inputs: secrecy scenario \(L \in\{A, B, C\}\), and \(\epsilon_{1}\);
    for \(\alpha_{1}=0: \epsilon_{1}: 1\) do
        for \(\alpha_{2}=0: \epsilon_{1}: 1-\alpha_{1}\) do
            \(\alpha_{0}=1-\alpha_{1}-\alpha_{2}\);
            switch L
            case A:
                Obtain \(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}\) using Lemma 1 in problem (9);
                Compute \(R_{1 p}\) in (9);
            case B or C:
                Obtain \(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}\) by solving (23) using BFGS;
                Compute \(R_{1 c}\) in (10);
            end switch
            switch L
            case A or B:
                Obtain \(\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{*}\) using Theorem 1 , the \(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}\) in Line 7 or
                Line 10, and Lemma 1 in problem (11);
                Compute \(R_{2 p}\) in (11);
            case C:
                Obtain \(\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{*}\) using Theorem 2, the \(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{*}\) in Line 10,
                and BFGS by solving (27);
                Compute \(R_{2 c}\) in (15);
            end switch
            Compute \(R_{0}\) as described in Step 4;
        end for
    end for
    if \(L=A\) or \(L=C\) then
        swap all subscripts of 1 and 2 in (5) or (8);
        repeat switch and obtain \(\mathcal{R}_{21}^{\mathrm{DPC}}\left(\alpha_{k}\right)\) or \(\mathcal{R}_{21}\left(\alpha_{k}\right)\) in
        Corollary 1 and Corollary 3;
    end if
    outputs: \(R_{\mathrm{L}}(P)\).
```

of optimization will result in a different rate region. The convex hull of the two solutions with different orders enlarges the achievable rate region. The achievable secrecy rate for Scenario C is given by Corollary 3 .

Corollary 3: The achievable S-DPC rate region for the secure MIMO-NOMA Scenario $C$ under the total power is the convex hull of all rate triples

$$
\begin{equation*}
R_{C}(P)=\operatorname{conv}\left\{\left(\bigcup_{\alpha_{k}} \mathcal{R}_{12}\left(\alpha_{k}\right)\right) \bigcup\left(\bigcup_{\alpha_{k}} \mathcal{R}_{21}\left(\alpha_{k}\right)\right)\right\} \tag{28}
\end{equation*}
$$

in which $\mathcal{R}_{12}\left(\alpha_{k}\right)=\left(R_{1 c}^{*}\left(\alpha_{1}\right), R_{2 c}^{*}\left(\alpha_{2}\right), R_{0}^{*}\left(\alpha_{0}\right)\right), k=0,1,2$, is obtained by encoding the confidential messages for user 1 first, then user 2 , and lastly the common message for both, whereas $\mathcal{R}_{21}\left(\alpha_{k}\right)=\left(\bar{R}_{1 c}^{*}(\alpha), \bar{R}_{2 c}^{*}(\alpha), \bar{R}_{0}^{*}\left(\alpha_{0}\right)\right)$ is obtained in the reverse order of confidential messages (first user 2 then user $1)$.

Algorithm 1 summarizes the power splitting method for all scenarios. $\epsilon_{1}$ is the searching step for the power allocation factor. If $\alpha_{1}=\alpha_{2}=0$ and $\alpha_{0} \neq 0$, then the system reduces to multicasting transmission. If no power is allocated to the common message, it is the private transmission cases in the next

Section IV. If only the power of one of the secrecy messages is zero ( $\alpha_{k}=0, k=1$ or 2 ), the problem is the integrated service with confidential and common messages [41].

The precoding order for secrecy messages at different scenarios is not the same. Corollary 1 and Corollary 3 require an exchange of subscripts. For Scenario A, this is because the encoding order affects the achievable rate region. For Scenario C, although encoding order is irrelevant to the achievable rate in S-DPC, the order of optimization (solve the covariance matrix) will affect the solution [38]. This is because the power splitting method splits the power among the messages and solves them one by one. This simplifies the problem but is sub-optimal in general. Then, changing the precoding order may enlarge the achievable rate region. For scenario B, as proved in [23, Remark 4], it is always better to cancel the private massage $M_{2 p}$ at user 1 and treat the confidential message $M_{1 c}$ at user 2 as noise [23, Remark 4]. Thus, there is no need to exchange the precoding order.

Remark 1 (Complexity): For Scenario A, Step 2a, Step 3a, Case 1, and Case 2 in Step 4 are analytical, which only requires the computation of matrix multiplications and matrix inverse. The computation of matrix multiplications and matrix inverse has the complexity of $\mathcal{O}\left(m^{3}\right)$ in which $m=\max \left(n_{t}, n_{1}, n_{2}\right)$. Case 3 in Step 4 uses fmincon which is achieved mainly by BFGS. The BFGS algorithm yields the complexity $\mathcal{O}\left(n^{2}\right)$ [43], and the input variable $n=\frac{\left(n_{t}+1\right) n_{t}}{2}$ is rotation parameters [44]. Thus, the complexity of Scenario A is $\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{m^{3}+n_{t}^{4}}{\epsilon_{1}^{2}}\right)$. For Scenario B and Scenario C, the complexity of solving wiretap channels in Step $2 b$ and Step $3 b$ has $\mathcal{O}\left(m^{3}+n_{t}^{4}\right)$. Ignore the coefficient, the overall complexity of Algorithm 1 is $\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{m^{3}+n_{t}^{4}}{\epsilon_{1}^{2}}\right)$. The achievable DPC/S-DPC rate region in Scenario A [20], Scenario B [23], and Scenario C [15], [24] are found by using an exhaustive search over a set of positive semidefinite matrices, which have exponential complexity in terms of $m$. The three-dimensional space search in DPC or S-DPC has to be "exhaustive" but the search over the power allocation factors is linear.

## IV. Weighted Sum Rate Formulation for Secrecy

We consider the subcases of the three scenarios without a common message ( $M_{0}=\emptyset$ ) in this section. A WSR maximization based on BSMM [37], [42] is generalized to all scenarios. The WSR maximization under a total power constraint is formulated as

$$
\begin{align*}
\varphi(P)= & \max _{\mathbf{Q}_{j} \succcurlyeq 0} \sum_{j} w_{j} R_{j}, \quad j=1,2 \\
& \text { s.t. } \operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{j}\right) \leq P, \tag{29}
\end{align*}
$$

where $R_{j}:=R_{j p}$ in Scenario $\mathrm{A}, R_{1}:=R_{1 c}$ and $R_{2}:=R_{2 p}$ in Scenario B, and $R_{j}:=R_{j c}$ in Scenario C. $w_{j} \geq 0$ is a weight. The Lagrangian of the problem (29) is

$$
\begin{equation*}
L\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}, \lambda\right)=w_{1} R_{1}+w_{2} R_{2}-\lambda\left(\operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}+\mathbf{Q}_{2}\right)-P\right) \tag{30}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\lambda$ is the Lagrange multiplier related to the total power constraint. The dual function is a maximization of the Lagrangian

$$
\begin{equation*}
g(\lambda)=\max _{\mathbf{Q}_{k} \succcurlyeq 0} L\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}, \lambda\right) \tag{31}
\end{equation*}
$$

and the dual problem is given by $\min _{\lambda \geq 0} g(\lambda)$.
Lemma 2: The problem in (29) has zero duality gap and the KKT conditions are necessary for the optimal solution.

Proof: The duality gap is zero in Scenario A because the problem can be transferred to a convex problem satisfying Slater's condition [45]. Scenario B has zero duality gap, see the details in Appendix A in [2]. Scenario C has been discussed in [37, Theorem 1] which satisfies Lemma 2.

Since the problem in (31) is a nonconvex problem in any secrecy transmission, the BSMM [37], [42] can be considered which alternatively updates covariance matrix by maximizing a set of strictly convex local approximations. Specifically, Scenario C has been studied in [37]. We discuss Scenario A and Scenario B in this paper.

## A. Scenario A

It is worth noting that the MAC-BC duality [32] is applied to the WSR maximization in [34] where the WSR on the MAC rate region is transformed to an equivalent WSR on the BC rate region by an iterative algorithm. Then, the WSR can be solved using convex optimization. Once the optimum uplink covariance matrices are determined by any standard convex optimization tool, the equivalent downlink covariance matrices can be obtained through the duality transformation [32]. The optimization in MAC requires a descent algorithm over a line search with a tolerance. It also mentions that the DPC rate region is difficult to compute without employing duality [32]. Yet in this paper, we provide an alternative solution without applying the MAC-BC duality. We form a WSR for the DPC rate region directly and solve the maximization by using BSMM.

We can apply BSMM which updates covariance matrices by successively optimizing the lower bound of local approximation of $f\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}\right)=L\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}, \lambda\right)$ [37], [42]. Rewrite $f\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}\right)$ into the summation of one convex and one concave functions

$$
\begin{equation*}
f\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}\right)=f_{1}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}\right)+f_{2}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}\right) \tag{32}
\end{equation*}
$$

in which

$$
\begin{align*}
f_{1}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}\right)= & \frac{w_{1}}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{1}^{T}\right|-\lambda \operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}\right)  \tag{33a}\\
f_{2}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}\right)= & \frac{w_{2}}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\left(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right)^{-1} \mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right| \\
& -\lambda\left(\operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{2}\right)-P\right) . \tag{33b}
\end{align*}
$$

$f_{1}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}\right)$ is a concave function of $\mathbf{Q}_{1}, f_{2}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}\right)$ is convex over $\mathbf{Q}_{1}$ by fixing $\mathbf{Q}_{2}$. After the decomposition, we can alternatively optimize $\mathbf{Q}_{1}$ and $\mathbf{Q}_{2}$ to find a lower bound for the weighted sum rate. For the $i$ th iteration, the function for $f_{2}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i-1)}\right)$ is lower-bounded by its first-order Taylor approximation [45]

$$
\begin{align*}
f_{2}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i-1)}\right) & \geq f_{2}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i-1)}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i-1)}\right) \\
& -\operatorname{tr}\left[\mathbf{A}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}-\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i-1)}\right)\right] \tag{34}
\end{align*}
$$

in which the power price matrix $\mathbf{A}$ is a negative partial derivative with respect to $\mathbf{Q}_{1}$

$$
\begin{align*}
\mathbf{A}= & -\nabla_{\mathbf{Q}_{1}} f_{2}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i-1)}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i-1)}\right) \\
= & -\frac{w_{2}}{\ln 2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\left(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i-1)}+\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i-1)}\right) \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right)^{-1} \mathbf{H}_{2} \\
& +\frac{w_{2}}{\ln 2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\left(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i-1)}\right) \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right)^{-1} \mathbf{H}_{2} \tag{35}
\end{align*}
$$

Then the problem is lower bounded as

$$
\begin{align*}
f\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i-1)}\right) & \geq f_{1}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}\right)+f_{2}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i-1)}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i-1)}\right) \\
& -\operatorname{tr}\left[\mathbf{A}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}-\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i-1)}\right)\right] \tag{36}
\end{align*}
$$

Then, we optimize the right-hand side of (36) by omitting the constant terms, which is equivalent as

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i)}=\arg \max _{\mathbf{Q}_{1}} \frac{w_{1}}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{1}^{T}\right|-\operatorname{tr}\left[(\lambda \mathbf{I}+\mathbf{A}) \mathbf{Q}_{1}\right] \tag{37}
\end{equation*}
$$

Next, we optimize $f\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i)}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}\right)$ by fixing $\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i)}$, which is equivalent as

$$
\begin{align*}
\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i)}=\arg \max _{\mathbf{Q}_{2}} & \frac{w_{2}}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\left(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i)} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right)^{-1} \mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right| \\
& -\lambda \operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{2}\right) \tag{38}
\end{align*}
$$

The optimal solution for (37) and (38) can be achieved by the following lemma [37].
Lemma 3: [37] For some $\mathbf{S} \succ \mathbf{0}$, the optimal solution of the problem

$$
\begin{equation*}
\max _{\mathbf{Q} \succcurlyeq \mathbf{0}} w \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{R}^{-1} \mathbf{H} \mathbf{Q} \mathbf{H}^{T}\right|-\operatorname{tr}(\mathbf{S Q}) \tag{39}
\end{equation*}
$$

is given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathbf{Q}^{*}=\mathbf{S}^{-1 / 2} \mathbf{V} \boldsymbol{\Lambda} \mathbf{V}^{T} \mathbf{S}^{-1 / 2} \tag{40}
\end{equation*}
$$

To use Lemma 3, we set $w=\frac{w_{1}}{2}, \mathbf{S}=\lambda \mathbf{I}+\mathbf{A}$, and $\mathbf{R}=\mathbf{I}$ for (37); and $w=\frac{w_{2}}{2}, \mathbf{S}=\lambda \mathbf{I}$, and $\mathbf{R}=\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i)} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}$ for (38). $\mathbf{V}, \mathbf{U}$, and $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}$ are obtained by eigenvalue decomposition of $\mathbf{R}^{-1 / 2} \mathbf{H} \mathbf{S}^{-1 / 2}=\mathbf{U d i a g}\left(\sigma_{1}, \sigma_{2}, \ldots, \sigma_{m}\right) \mathbf{V}^{T}, \sigma_{i} \geq 0$, $\forall i, \boldsymbol{\Lambda}=\operatorname{diag}\left[\left(w-1 / \sigma_{1}^{2}\right)^{+}, \ldots,\left(w-1 / \sigma_{m}^{2}\right)^{+}\right]$, and $(x)^{+}=$ $\max (x, 0)$.

## B. Scenario B

In Scenario B, what makes it different from Scenario A is the formulation of convex and concave functions, which can be written as

$$
\begin{align*}
f_{1}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}\right)= & \frac{w_{1}}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{1}^{T}\right|-\lambda \operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}\right)  \tag{41a}\\
f_{2}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}\right)= & -\frac{w_{1}}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right| \\
& +\frac{w_{2}}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\left(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right)^{-1} \mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right| \\
& -\lambda\left(\operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{2}\right)-P\right) . \tag{41b}
\end{align*}
$$

$f_{1}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}\right)$ is also a concave function of $\mathbf{Q}_{1}, f_{2}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}\right)$ is convex by fixing $\mathbf{Q}_{2}$ because the second term in (41b) is convex over $\mathbf{Q}_{1}$. For the $i$ th iteration, the function for $f_{2}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i-1)}\right)$ is lower-bounded by its first-order Taylor approximation as the expression in (34), in which the power price matrix

$$
\mathbf{A}=-\nabla_{\mathbf{Q}_{1}} f_{2}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i-1)}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i-1)}\right)
$$

```
Algorithm 2: WSR Maximization for all Three Scenarios
Without a Common Message.
    inputs: \(\lambda^{\max }, \lambda^{\min }, \epsilon_{2}, \epsilon_{3}\), secrecy scenario
    \(\mathrm{L} \in\{\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B}, \mathrm{C}\} ;\)
    while \(\lambda^{\max }-\lambda^{\min }>\epsilon_{2}\) do
        \(\lambda:=\left(\lambda^{\max }+\lambda^{\min }\right) / 2\);
        \(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(0)}:=\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(0)}:=\frac{P}{2 n_{t}} \mathbf{I} ;\)
        \(R^{(0)}:=0\);
        \(i=0\);
        while 1 do
            \(i=i+1\);
            switch L
            case A:
                    Solve \(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i)}\) and \(\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i)}\) in (37)-(38) using Lemma 3;
                    Compute \(R_{1}\) and \(R_{2}\) in (5);
            case B:
                Solve \(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i)}\) and \(\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i)}\) in (43)-(44) using Lemma 3;
                    Compute \(R_{1}\) and \(R_{2}\) in (7);
        case C:
            Solve \(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i)}\) and \(\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i)}\) in [37, Algorithm 1, lines
            5-13];
            Obtain \(R_{1}\) and \(R_{2}\) in (8);
        end switch
            \(R^{(i)}:=w_{1} R_{1}+w_{2} R_{2}\)
        if \(\operatorname{abs}\left(R^{(i)}-R^{(i-1)}\right)<\epsilon_{3}\) then
            break;
        end if
        if \(\operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i)}+\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i)}\right)<P\) then
            \(\lambda^{\max }:=\lambda ;\)
        else
            \(\lambda^{\min }:=\lambda ;\)
        end if
        end while
    end while
    outputs: \(\lambda^{*}:=\lambda, R_{k}^{*}:=R_{k}\), and \(\mathbf{Q}_{k}^{*}=\mathbf{Q}_{k}^{(i)}\),
    \(k \in\{1,2\}\).
```

$$
\begin{align*}
= & \frac{w_{1}+w_{2}}{2 \ln 2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\left(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i-1)} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right)^{-1} \mathbf{H}_{2} \\
& -\frac{w_{2}}{2 \ln 2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\left(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i-1)}+\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i-1)}\right) \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right)^{-1} \mathbf{H}_{2} . \tag{42}
\end{align*}
$$

Finally, we optimize the right-hand side of (36) with the power price matrix in (42), which is equivalent as

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i)}=\arg \max _{\mathbf{Q}_{1}} \frac{w_{1}}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{1} \mathbf{Q}_{1} \mathbf{H}_{1}^{T}\right|-\operatorname{tr}\left[(\lambda \mathbf{I}-\mathbf{A}) \mathbf{Q}_{1}\right] . \tag{43}
\end{equation*}
$$

Next, we optimize $L\left(\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i)}, \mathbf{Q}_{2}\right)$ by fixing $\mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i)}$, which is equivalent as

$$
\begin{align*}
\mathbf{Q}_{2}^{(i)}=\arg \max _{\mathbf{Q}_{2}} & \frac{w_{2}}{2} \log \left|\mathbf{I}+\left(\mathbf{I}+\mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{1}^{(i)} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right)^{-1} \mathbf{H}_{2} \mathbf{Q}_{2} \mathbf{H}_{2}^{T}\right| \\
& -\lambda \operatorname{tr}\left(\mathbf{Q}_{2}\right) \tag{44}
\end{align*}
$$



Fig. 3. Capacity regions of three scenarios under an average total power constraint without common message over the channel $H_{1}=\left[\begin{array}{lll}0.3 & 2.5 & 2.2 \\ 1.8\end{array}\right]$ and $H_{2}=[1.31 .2 ; 1.53 .9]$, and $P=12$.

The WSR maximization for all scenarios without a common message is summarized in Algorithm 2. $\epsilon_{2}$ and $\epsilon_{3}$ are the bisection search accuracy and convergence tolerance of BSMM, respectively. If $w_{1}=0$ and $w_{2}=1$, the problem reduces to a P2P MIMO with an analytical solution. Algorithm 2 becomes a WF regime. If $w_{1}=1$ and $w_{2}=0$, then the problem reduces to a MIMO wiretap channel. Then, Algorithm 2 is nothing but AOWF [30]. The WSR maximization is hard to be extended directly to the general cases of the three scenarios, because the max-min problem of multicasting is not derivable in BSMM although the multicasting problem owns convexity.

Encoding order in different scenarios is distinguished. In Scenario A, the weight determines the optimal encoding order. For example, if $w_{1}>w_{2}$, the optimal encoding order is to encode user 1 first and then user 2. In Scenario B, the entire capacity region uses DPC to cancel the signal of the private message $M_{2 p}$ intended for user 2 at user 1 only. The other variant which treats the private message $M_{2 p}$ of user 2 as interference for user 1 is unnecessary [23, Remark 4]. In Scenario C, the S-DPC owns the invariant property that the achievable rate region is irrelevant to the encoding order [15].

The three scenarios without common messages differentiate the security requirements. For comparison, we show an example in Fig. 3 with the same channel settings as [14], [23]. First, when the secrecy message of user 2 is empty, i.e., $M_{2 p}=\emptyset$ in Scenario B and $M_{2 c}=\emptyset$ in Scenario C, the maximal achieving rates for user 1 in the two cases are the same, and the two problems drop to the Gaussian wiretap channel. Second, when the secrecy message of user 1 is empty, i.e., $M_{1 p}=\emptyset$ in Scenario A and $M_{1 c}=\emptyset$ in Scenario B, the achieving rates for user 2 in the two cases become the same P2P MIMO problem. Third, imposing a secrecy constraint on two users in Scenario C strictly shrinks the capacity region compared with Scenario A.

Remark 2 (Complexity): The number of iterations of the BSMM is $\mathcal{O}\left(1 / \epsilon_{3}\right)$, and the bisection search requires $\mathcal{O}\left(\log \left(1 / \epsilon_{2}\right)\right.$. The WSR of Algorithm 2 has the complexity of $\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{m^{3}}{\sigma \epsilon_{3}} \log \left(1 / \epsilon_{2}\right)\right)$ with a search step $\sigma$ over the weight [37], [38]. On the other hand, the computation complexity of Algorithm 1 without common messages is $\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{m^{3}+n_{t}^{4}}{\epsilon_{1}}\right)$ with only one layer of search loop over $\alpha_{1}$.


Fig. 4. Secrecy rate regions of MIMO-NOMA with different scenarios of security ( $n_{t}=n_{1}=n_{2}=2$, and $P=10$ with the same channels shown in (45)). The yellow curved mesh is the secrecy capacity region, the colorful surface denotes the achievable rate region realized by Algorithm 1, and the TDMA (gray cube) is achieved via three orthogonal time slots.

## V. Numerical Results

In this section, we perform numerical results to illustrate the achievable secrecy rate region of the three scenarios and then verify Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.

## A. Secrecy Rate Regions for Three Scenarios

We verify the transmission rates and consider the same channels for all three scenarios, and the channels for user 1 and user 2 chosen to be

$$
\mathbf{H}_{1}=\left[\begin{array}{ll}
0.3861 & 0.6355  \tag{45}\\
0.9995 & 0.6259
\end{array}\right], \mathbf{H}_{2}=\left[\begin{array}{ll}
0.4977 & 0.9658 \\
0.9245 & 0.6116
\end{array}\right]
$$

where the channel coefficients are generated randomly according to the standard Gaussian distribution, and the total power is 10 . The search steps for $\alpha_{1}$ in Algorithm 1 is 0.05 . Fig. 4 depicts the secrecy rate regions of the three scenarios. The PS scheme is compared with TDMA based scheme which is realized by transmitting messages in three orthogonal time slots with equal length. Also, the upper bounds are achieved by DPC [20], [21] for Scenario A, capacity rate regions [23] and [15] for Scenario B and C, respectively, which are realized by exhaustive search over all possible covariance matrices. It is shown that the proposed precoding and power allocation method significantly outperforms the TDMA strategy, and it is close to that of the capacity rate regions. The projection of the secrecy capacity region onto the $\left(R_{1}, R_{2}\right)$ or $\left(R_{0}, R_{j}\right), j=1,2$, plane is the capacity region with two secrecy messages or only one secrecy message, which is going to appear in the next subsections.

It is worth mentioning that in Scenario A, given a set of power allocation parameters, we can analytically obtain the rate triples, i.e., SVD and WF in Step $2 a$ and Step 3a. The complexity of the algorithm for finding one point on the region only comes from matrix operations, and no search is needed. In [11, Section III] where each user is equipped with one antenna, the rate maximization optimization is transferred to the power minimization problem, and thus a linear semi-definite convex optimization is obtained, but it needs a binomial search of one parameter and then apply one numerical method using standard SDP methods, e.g., CVX [46].

## B. Secrecy Rate Regions Without Common Messages

Consider the MIMO-NOMA without a common message. The achievable rate region is realized by Algorithm 1 with $M_{0}=\emptyset$ and $\alpha_{0}=0$, and Algorithm 2. The capacity regions are achieved by the parameters including the search step 0.01 , the total power $P=2,4,10$, respectively, and the channels for all three scenarios are

$$
\begin{align*}
\mathbf{H}_{1} & =\left[\begin{array}{ccc}
0.1560 & -0.6372 & -0.4055 \\
-1.1450 & -0.1417 & 0.0708
\end{array}\right], \\
\mathbf{H}_{2} & =\left[\begin{array}{lll}
-1.5032 & 0.5503 & -0.0334
\end{array}\right] . \tag{46}
\end{align*}
$$

Figure 5 compares the rate regions of the proposed power splitting scheme with the capacity region achieved by DPC for Scenario A [6], [33] generated using the iterative algorithm with MAC-BC duality presented [34], and Scenario B [23], respectively, and S-DPC [14] for Scenario C. In Scenario C, our algorithms are compared with the GSVD [36] and BSMM [37]. Both proposed methods can reach the secrecy capacity region and outperform OMA. The PS method in Algorithm 1 is faster and more general for all scenarios, while the WSR method in Algorithm 2 is specific to the case without multicasting.

To illustrate the effectiveness of the algorithms in Scenario A compared with GSVD in [35], we consider another case when the number of receivers' antennas is limited to be the same, i.e., $n_{1}=n_{2}$. The channels are

$$
\begin{align*}
& \mathbf{H}_{1}=\left[\begin{array}{ccc}
-1.3784 & 0.2593 & -0.2040 \\
-1.0689 & -2.4811 & -1.2978
\end{array}\right] \\
& \mathbf{H}_{2}=\left[\begin{array}{ccc}
-0.3403 & 0.1358 & -1.9706 \\
-2.2982 & -1.8135 & 0.2904
\end{array}\right] \tag{47}
\end{align*}
$$

and $P=10$. From Fig. 6, the proposed algorithms can achieve a larger rate region than GSVD [35] and OMA. In addition, we provide one case with the same setting as in [32, Fig. 3] to show the effectiveness of our algorithms. The channels are:

$$
\mathbf{h}_{1}=\left[\begin{array}{ll}
1 & 0.4
\end{array}\right], \mathbf{h}_{2}=\left[\begin{array}{ll}
0.4 & 1 \tag{48}
\end{array}\right]
$$

and $P=10$. The results are shown in Fig. 7. The iteration tolerance $t$ in [34] is set as $10^{-3}$, and a bisection search is applied to find the optimal $t$. We set our iteration accuracy $\epsilon_{2}$ and convergence tolerance $\epsilon_{3}$ in Algorithm 2 as $10^{-3}$. The


Fig. 5. Secrecy rate regions of MIMO-NOMA without multicasting services with different security requirements ( $n_{t}=3, n_{1}=2, n_{2}=1$ and $P=2,4,10$ with the same channel setting in (46)). The blue dot line denotes the achievable or secrecy capacity region realized by DPC or S-DPC, the red line and yellow line are achieved by Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, respectively. The dash purple line is OMA reached by the time-sharing between the two extreme points [38].


Fig. 6. Comparison of the rate regions of Scenario A, DPC [34], GSVD [35], the proposed schemes, and OMA for $P=10, n_{t}=3, n_{1}=n_{2}=2$, and channels are given in (47).


Fig. 7. Comparison of the rate regions of Scenario A, DPC [34], GSVD [35], the proposed schemes, and OMA for $P=10$, and $n_{t}=2, n_{1}=n_{2}=1$, and the channels are given in (48).
complexity is the same because both methods require finding the covariance matrices iteratively. The tolerance in [34] and the Lagrange multiplier in Algorithm 2 are both optimized through bisection search. Algorithm 1 is very fast without any search for one power allocation factor but is sub-optimal.

## C. Multicast Message and One Confidential Message

If we set $\alpha_{2}=0$ in Scenario C, then the general problem is reduced to the integrated services with one confidential and


Fig. 8. Comparison of the achievable rate regions of rotation-based exhaustive search [41], GSVD [40], the proposed scheme, and TDMA for $P=15, n_{t}=$ $3, n_{1}=4, n_{2}=3$, and channels are given in (49).
one common message ${ }^{2}$, i.e., $\left(R_{0}, R_{1 c}\right)$. As shown in Fig. 8, the proposed method substantially outperforms the GSVD-based orthogonal subchannel precoding method in [40], in which the turning point is a switch of subchannel selection schemes. Compared with the GSVD, Algorithm 1 makes better use of the channel without decomposing the channel into many orthogonal subchannels. Also, our method is very close to the secrecy capacity obtained by rotation-based random exhaustive search [41]. In this simulation, search step for $\alpha_{1}$ is $0.05, P=15$, and channels are

$$
\begin{align*}
\mathbf{H}_{1} & =\left[\begin{array}{ccc}
0.0653 & 0.0185 & 1.0397 \\
-0.1762 & -1.5297 & 0.1460 \\
0.9822 & -1.9882 & -0.1263 \\
0.9421 & -0.1771 & 0.3746
\end{array}\right], \\
\mathbf{H}_{2} & =\left[\begin{array}{ccc}
-0.0248 & 1.3016 & 0.4677 \\
0.0523 & -0.1297 & 0.4269 \\
0.6795 & -1.1725 & -0.8358
\end{array}\right] . \tag{49}
\end{align*}
$$

We notice that GSVD has been applied to many subcases. Examples are two private messages in Scenario A [35], two confidential messages in Scenario C [36], and one confidential

[^2]TABLE II
Comparison Among Different Precoding Schemes for the MIMO-NOMA With Different Communication Scenarios

|  | DPC/S-DPC | WSR with BSMM <br> (proposed for Scenario A, B <br> without common message) | PS <br> (proposed for all scenarios) | GSVD | OMA |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Performance | optimal | suboptimal <br> (but close to optimal) | suboptimal <br> (but close to optimal) | suboptimal | highly <br> suboptimal |
| Speed | generally slow | acceptable for a small $m$ <br> $\left(m=\max \left(n_{t}, n_{1}, n_{2}\right)\right)$ | fast for a small $n_{t}$ | fast | very fast |
| Complexity | generally high | acceptable | acceptable | low | low |
| Generality | $\checkmark$ | not easy to generalize <br> for common message | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |

message and one common message [47]. Thus, it also has the potential to become an efficient and general tool for all scenarios. But, it should be noted that the performance of GSVD is affected by the number of antennas at the transmitter and users [35], [44]. Algorithm 2 outperforms GSVD and sometimes Algorithm 1, but it is not easy to extend it to common messages. Algorithm 1 balances the two methods. We summarize the benefits and properties of the precoding schemes in Table II.

Three signaling design families in the MIMO-NOMA with different secrecy requirements are:

- GSVD is the fastest general tool but has poor performance in some antenna settings.
- PS (Algorithm 1) is a general but suboptimal tool. It balances time and performance.
- WSR (Algorithm 2) is locally optimal with KKT as the optimal necessary conditions. It has relatively high time complexity.


## VI. CONCLUSION

We have investigated a two-user MIMO-NOMA network with different security requirements. Specifically, three scenarios are differentiated according to the required services: multicast, private, and/or confidential services. A PS scheme has been proposed which decomposes the MIMO-BC into the P2P MIMO, wiretap, and multicasting channels. Then, existing solutions can be applied to obtain the precoding and power allocation matrices. The proposed PS can achieve near-capacity rate regions which are significantly higher compared to the existing orthogonal methods. In addition, in the case of the MIMO-NOMA networks without multicasting, a WSR maximization based on BSMM is formulated for all three scenarios. We generalize and prove that the zero duality gap holds for the WSR maximization, and the KKT conditions are necessary for the optimality. The two methods have their advantages. PS is a general tool for the MIMO-NOMA with different scenarios of security, while the WSR maximization provides a great potential for the secure MIMO-NOMA without multicasting. Both methods are computationally efficient compared with the DPC or S-DPC.

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[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ The S-DPC can assure security between the two users because a precoding matrix is selected such that it satisfies two goals [14, Remark 5]. First, it helps to cancel the precoding signal representing message $M_{2 c}$, so that $M_{1 c}$ can be served with an interference-free legitimate user channel. Second, it boosts the secrecy for message $M_{2 c}$ by causing interference (artificial noise) to user 1. In other words, user 1 can remove the interference of user 2 but is not able to decode the message of user 2.

[^2]:    ${ }^{2}$ One can also set $\alpha_{1}=0$ and change the order of channels for $\left(R_{0}, R_{2 c}\right)$ which finally will resort to the same results due to duality.

